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Resumo 
 
O tamanho das cidades tem se tornado um problema desde a aceitação da doutrina da Nova Gestão Pública, que 
sugeriu a desagregação de estruturas em unidades gerenciáveis. Em alguns países, existe um grande número de 
cidades pequenas que se sustentam, quase que exclusivamente, com transferências intergovernamentais. Este 
artigo pretende contribuir com a literatura sobre gerenciamento do desempenho de organizações públicas com a 
apresentação de evidências empíricas sobre os fatores determinantes do desempenho financeiro desse tipo de 
organizações. Os dados advêm de uma amostra de cidades brasileiras, e se referem ao período de 2005 a 2008. A 
principal descoberta da pesquisa está relacionada com a conclusão de que cidades maiores teriam melhores 
condições de gerenciar recursos financeiros, estando aptas a aumentar as receitas e a controlar despesas do que 
cidades menores, e esse fato apresenta uma contribuição importante para a discussão entre fusão e fragmentação 
de cidades. Em cidades menores, os prefeitos possuem condições menos favoráveis de aumentar a arrecadação 
dos impostos e de reduzir despesas, o que torna suas administrações vulneráveis pela dependência de recursos 
externos. Uma outra contribuição se refere ao fato de que a qualificação pessoal do prefeito, em um regime no 
qual todas as decisões estão centralizadas em uma só pessoa, exerce efeito insignificante sobre o desempenho 
financeiro da prefeitura. 
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Abstract 
 
Municipality size has become an issue since the New Public Management doctrine of disaggregating structures 
into manageable units. In some countries, this doctrine led to the creation of small-scale agencies relying heavily 
upon  transfers  from  upper-level  governments.  This  paper  aims  to  contribute  to  performance  management 
literature  by  providing  empirical  evidence  about  some  determinant  factors  that  are  likely  to  endow  local 
governments with superior financial performance. Data came from a sample of Brazilian municipalities and 
refers to the period 2005-2008. The main conclusion of this investigation is that larger cities are more likely to 
manage revenue and expenditure better than are smaller cities, which aligns with the discussion of amalgamation 
versus fragmentation. This conclusion stems from the findings that in small municipalities mayors have fewer 
conditions to improve financial performance due to the difficulty of raising and collecting taxes and of reducing 
expenditures, which makes their administrations far more dependent upon external sources of money. Therefore, 
this dependent relationship can be seen as the cause of poor financial performance to the extent that it lowers 
mayoral discretion when  making decisions. Another contribution this paper proposes to theory and practice 
relates to the fact that in the strong-mayor form of local government, mayoral qualification is likely to have little 
effect upon performance. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Scholars have dedicated a great deal of time and effort to finding the determinant factors likely 
to improve the performance of public organizations (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2011). There are 
several dimensions that frame public managers’ actions to promote superior performance, as indicated 
by Rainey and Steinbauer (1999), Boyne (2003), Vilkinas, Cartan and Piron (1994), Brewer (2005), 
Moynihan and Pandey (2005), and O’Toole and Meier (1999). In spite of the number and variety of 
studies that have been undertaken, we still don’t know with certainty the whole set of independent 
variables that are likely to improve municipal government performance. When the focus is placed on 
developing countries the situation is more complex due to the political and administrative differences 
from developed countries. 
In this paper we analyze the performance of a sample of Brazilian municipalities in terms of 
finance. As local governments are entitled to raise some taxes locally, specifically taxes on property 
and services (Hoene & Pagano, 2008), we created an index for measuring how efficient  a given 
administration is at securing money for administrative expenditure on the municipality’s operations. 
As  a  strong-mayor  system  of  government  (Mouritzen  &  Svara,  2002),  mayors  are  both  political 
leaders and municipal managers and they are empowered to manage the municipality on a day-to-day 
basis, managing policies and resources, as well as dealing with political issues. We regard this issue as 
critical to the extent that the vast majority of Brazilian municipalities rely heavily on transfers from 
Federal and State governments (Martell, 2008; Mattos, Rocha, & Arvate, 2011) in order to ensure 
fiscal equilibrium, which increases local government dependence on good relationships with upper-
level  government  for  ensuring  the  flow  of  money  (Fenno,  1966;  Whitney,  2013)  and,  therefore, 
reducing mayors’ managerial discretion (Meier & Keiser, 1996). This also seems to be a typical case 
of the Flypaper Effect (Hamilton, 1986; Hines & Thaler, 1995; Mattos et al., 2011), as money that 
comes  from  upper-level  government  grants  increase  local  government  expenditure  more  than  the 
money that comes from taxpayers’ personal incomes. According to Inman (2008, p. 1), “an extra 
dollar  of  personal income  increased  government  spending  on  the  order  of  $0.02  to  $0.05  but  an 
equivalent extra dollar of grants-in-aid increased government spending by $0.30 to often as much as a 
full dollar”. Mayors take the transfer of funds from other levels of government for granted, and federal 
governments use this as a means for improving economic conditions (Bailey & Connolly, 1998). We 
contend that the higher the percentage of taxes a mayor is able to raise locally, the lower the level of 
dependence and reliance on transfers from other levels of government and the greater the autonomy of 
the mayor, and, therefore, the higher the discretion for making decisions. As independent variables we 
used mayoral quality (represented by age, educational level and previous government experience), and 
population size. As a control variable, we used ideology (whether the political party the mayor is 
affiliated to is regarded as to the left or to the right). 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly present the Brazilian local 
government system and the importance of the mayor’s role in managing resources and delivering 
services to the local population. In the following section we discuss the theories underpinning the 
choice of dependent and independent variables for the creation of the hypotheses. This is followed by 
the methods employed in the investigation, and a discussion of results of the analysis. The paper ends 
with conclusions and the prospects for further work based on the present study. 
 
 
The Brazilian System of Local Government  
 
 
In terms of the framework for analyzing local government developed by Mouritzen and Svara 
(2002),  Brazil  adopts  the  strong-mayor  form,  where  mayors  act  as  both  political  leaders  and 
managers; i.e. the mayor is in charge of the whole set of decisions involving the daily activities of the 
local  government,  as  well  as  managing  contacts  and  negotiations  with  the  State  and  Federal Analyzing Local Government Financial Performance  707 
RAC, Rio de Janeiro, v. 17, n. 6, art. 4, pp. 704-719, Nov./Dez. 2013                 www.anpad.org.br/rac   
Governments, other bodies of government and wider society. At the same time as he/she deals with 
the Municipal Chamber (local legislative power) for approving laws and fights with the Federal and 
State  Government  for  more  resources,  he/she  is  involved  in  the  daily  activities  of  managing  the 
resources the municipality needs to operate.  
Brazil has  a  federal  political  system  (Watts,  1998) and  after  the  1988  Federal  Constitution 
adopted Fiscal Federalism, in which municipalities are regarded as autonomous entities (Watts, 1998); 
i.e. they are entitled to have a constitution (labeled as the Organic Law), and to collect some taxes 
locally, specifically property and services tax, and other sources of contributions (Selcher, 1998). In a 
Brazilian municipality, these are the main sources of local income over which the mayor has some 
discretion (Selcher, 1998). 
At the present time, Brazil has 5,565 municipalities, whose population ranges from around 
1,000 up to 11,000,000 inhabitants (the capital city of São Paulo) (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística [IBGE], 2011). It is worth mentioning that since the 1988 Federal Constitution, the number 
of Brazilian municipalities has greatly increased (Dahlby, 2011). The size of the municipalities can be 
represented as a skewed distribution with positive asymmetry, as most municipalities are smaller than 
50,000 inhabitants. The variety in terms of size means that municipalities are unequal in terms of their 
capacity to raise money in the form of taxes. For example, large cities are more likely to raise more 
money from both property and service taxes than are small cities, due to economies of scale (Shapiro, 
1963). 
In Brazil, mayors are elected for a four-year political mandate and elections do not coincide 
with those for the president and governors. Municipal elections were held in 2004, 2008, and 2012, 
while presidential elections occurred in 2002, 2006, and 2010. 
In terms of revenue, Brazilian Municipalities  have several sources, which are  composed of 
locally taxes collected, contributions, fares, and transfers from Federal and State Governments, but the 
greatest source of transfers is the Municipal Participation Fund (MPF) (Mattos et al., 2011, p. 247), 
which is distributed according to the following formula: “The MPF resources go 10% to the state 
capitals, 86.4% to the countryside municipalities and the remainder is shared among the countryside 
municipalities  with  more  than  142,633  inhabitants”.  The  amount  of  money  a  given  municipality 
receives from the MPF is defined by two factors, namely population and per capita incomes. As 
population and per capita factors are likely to change from one period to another, there is room for 
negotiation between mayors and upper-level governments in order to mitigate this fact. Due to the 
importance of the negotiation between mayors and Federal Government officers, in which the most 
important  cities  are  likely  to  take  advantage  of  their  position,  the  amount  of  money  can  change 
according to the political importance of the municipality (Mattos et al., 2011). 
 
 
Determinants of Performance 
 
 
Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) proposed a framework that contains a set of factors likely to 
explain  the  effectiveness  of  public  agencies. These  factors  are  support  and  control  from  external 
stakeholders,  resource  availability,  organizational  culture,  leadership,  mission  valence,  and  task 
design. In the same line of thinking, Boyne (2003) proposed that public services performance is likely 
to  be  explained  by  the  amount  of  resources,  regulation,  differences  in  market  competition, 
organizational factors, and management. The question that still remains is whether we need to deal 
with these predictor factors together, or is it possible to identify the individual contribution of each 
factor to performance? 
In terms of managing performance, finance is a resource and, therefore, also very likely to be an 
end  in  the  performance  management  framework.  As  a  main  assumption  of  this  investigation,  we 
contended that by wisely  managing financial resources, managers are more likely to improve the R. C. Gomes, S. Alfinito, P. H. M. Albuquerque  708 
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quality of services provided to the public. Some studies associate high quality financial management 
with  several  dimensions  of  performance  (Ogden  &  Watson,  1999;  Stanwick  &  Stanwick,  1998; 
Waddock & Smith, 2000). This makes it reasonable to assume that good financial management is a 
determinant factor of superior organizational performance.  
According to Zafra-Gómez, López-Hernández and Hernández-Bastida (2009), there are several 
ways for assessing local government financial conditions, but assets and liabilities are to be taken into 
account in order to assess sustainability, flexibility and vulnerability. The authors particularly stress 
the importance of vulnerability as “an organization’s level of dependence on external funding received 
via transfers and grants” (Bohte, 2001, p. 154). The greater the dependence on external funds, the 
higher the level of dependence and the lower the level of discretion (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) for 
making  decisions  and  for  devising  policies.  In  the  same  line  of  thinking,  (Kloot,  1999,  p.  239) 
recommended “debt reduction strategies to demonstrate responsible financial management: ‘never to 
be in the red’; infrastructure and asset management; and long-term economic and social sustainability” 
as managerial drivers for local governments. Corroborating the idea that sustainability is associated 
with  performance,  Mogues  and  Benin  (2012)  found  out  that  external  grants  discourage  local 
government  efforts  to  raise  revenue  locally.  Another  way  of  assessing  government  financial 
performance relates to the fiscal health of the city in terms of the risk of bankruptcy, which according 
to Whitney (2013, p. 191), is the result of “budgetary mismanagement coupled with rising pension and 
debt costs”. In the United States there are several cases of cities that have declared bankruptcy in order 
to have “the time and fiscal breathing room required to develop and negotiate plans for reorganizing 
debt while protecting government from its creditors” (Whitney, 2013, p. 186). 
In this vein, vulnerability seems to be a feasible mean for assessing municipality performance. 
This  raises  the  question  of  what  should  be  regarded  as  determinant  factors  of  superior  financial 
performance in the case of municipalities. Approaching the question with the framework presented 
above, superior financial performance ought to be determined by some combination of resources and 
skills. Below, we suggest some sources of financial performance in local governments. 
 
Mayoral qualifications 
 
According to the extant literature, leaders have the means to influence followers’ performance 
(Besley,  Montalvo,  &  Reynal-Querol,  2011;  Lynn,  1996;  Pfeffer  &  Salancik,  2003).  Cognitive 
resource theory contends that experienced and educated leaders are more likely to produce better plans 
and make better decisions than others (Fiedler, 1986). In the same line of thinking, leadership theory 
suggests “heterogeneity among leaders’ educational attainment is important with growth being higher 
by having leaders who are more highly educated” (Besley et al., 2011, p. 205). 
Avellaneda  (2009)  used  educational  background  and  job-related  experience  for  measuring 
mayoral qualifications. She assumed that, “Education, for instance, generates confidence in decision 
making,  and  this  confidence  extends  toward  subalterns,  who  recognize  their  manager’s  abilities” 
(Avellaneda, 2009, p. 289). This assumption is coherent with the findings of Hambrick and Mason 
(1984),  who  suggested  an  association  between  formal  education  and  performance.  From  this 
assumption, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H1.  Municipal  financial  performance  is  positively  associated  with  the  mayor’s  educational 
background. 
In addition to educational background, a mayor’s previous experience can also add value to 
his/her performance as a result of knowledge gathered throughout his or her lifetime. Hambrick and 
Mason  (1984)  suggested  the  importance  of  age  as  a  factor  in  performance.  According  to  them, 
younger managers are more likely to take risks, while older managers are more inclined to “seek more 
information, to evaluate information accurately, and to take longer to make decisions” (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984, p. 198). From this assumption, we develop the following hypothesis:  Analyzing Local Government Financial Performance  709 
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H2. Municipal financial performance is positively associated with the mayor’s age. 
Taylor (1975) also stressed the importance of previous experience. According to him, “Years of 
experience in management was positively correlated with accuracy in judging the information value, 
time required to reach decisions, and the flexibility with which decisions are held” (Taylor, 1975, p. 
79).  This  would  suggests  that  having  more  life  experience  than  younger  managers,  and  having 
occupied  administrative  posts  in  local  government  administration,  experienced  managers  can  be 
expected to make wiser decisions than younger managers make. From this assumption, we propose the 
following hypothesis:  
H3.  Municipal  financial  performance  is  positively  associated  with  the  mayor’s  previous 
administrative experience. 
 
Population size 
 
Another issue in performance management is related to organization size, because of control 
over resources and economies of scale (Boyne, 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Shapiro, 1963). In the case of 
municipality size this discussion has been on the agenda for a long time (Borukhov, 1975). The idea of 
size as determinant to performance stems from the New Public Management doctrine in which public 
structures need to be disaggregated into smaller unities in order to be manageable (Hood, 1991). To 
this end, some studies are intended to understand the effects of amalgamation or fragmentation upon 
performance  (Boyne,  1996a).  Some  also  contended  that  the  relationship  between  population  size, 
costs, and public functions ought to be a curvilinear one (Carey, Srinivasan, & Strauss, 1996; Stafford, 
1963),  making  it  possible  to  identify  an  optimum  size,  which is a  controversial issue  due  to  the 
definition of how large a municipality is supposed to be in order to be able to provide quality services 
to the local population (Boyne, 1996b). While large municipalities are more likely to raise revenue due 
to economies of scale, they also have more costs to deliver services to the local population (Walzer, 
1972). On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that “central administrative costs are lower in 
larger  local  authorities”  (Andrews  &  Boyne,  2009,  p.  739).  Therefore,  there  is  evidence  that 
economies of scale must be treated cautiously in relation to local government performance (Boyne, 
1995). From these ideas, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H4. Municipal financial performance is positively associated with the size of the population. 
 
 
Method 
 
 
Research sample 
 
The sample of municipalities was composed of 830 observations. Their characteristics about 
population size, age of the mayors and GDP per capita are described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Research Sample 
 
   Minimum  Maximum  Mean  SD  Skewness  Std. Error 
Population size   884
a    570,042
b    18,173.16    37,230.93    7.44    0.09  
Mayor’s Age   25    85    48.52    10.06    0.38    0.09  
GDB per capita (R$ Thousand)   2.91
c    177.30
d    9.84
e    11.24    8.27    0.09  
Note. Source: data analysis. 
a Inhabitants of the municipality of Serra da Saudade. 
b Inhabitants of the municipality of Uberlandia. 
c GDP per capita of the 
municipality of Chapada do Norte. 
d GDP per capita of the municipality of Confins. 
e Roughly corresponds to US$ 5,000. R. C. Gomes, S. Alfinito, P. H. M. Albuquerque  710 
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In order to test the hypotheses proposed in this study, secondary data was collected from several 
reliable databases, namely those of the Secretariat of the National Treasury, the Superior Electoral 
Court, the Ministry of Health and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. 
 
Dependent variable 
 
As  dependent  variables,  we  proposed  an  index  to  measure  the  level  of  self-sufficiency  of 
Brazilian municipalities in terms of wisely managing financial resources (total revenues ratio total 
expenditures), and, therefore, the level of dependence upon external sources of revenues. In so doing, 
we collected data for the five-year period from 2004 to 2008. As the mayoral election took place in 
2004, we assessed how mayors managed revenue and expenditure over his/her whole period in charge 
of  their  respective  municipality’s  administration.  As  Brazil  adopts  the  strong  mayor  system  of 
government,  mayors  are  in  charge  of  managing  a  municipality  concerning  both  political  and 
administrative matters. Worth mentioning is that we cannot at this time update this data for the reason 
that the last municipal mandate (2008-2012) finished at the end of last year, and data will only be 
available sometime in the future.  
The most representative taxes mayors have control of are property taxes and service taxes, 
because they vary according to population size, and are, therefore, very likely to reflect economies of 
scale. As a result, we have chosen property and service taxes as the main sources of revenue the mayor 
has discretion over and whose appropriate management would increase revenue. Expenditure is the 
amount of money a municipality has to spend in order to be able to provide services and to manage the 
whole administrative machine. In this study, we used the total expenditure for representing the effort 
an administration makes to provide services to the local population.  
The three indexes, namely property tax revenue, services tax revenue, and total expenditure, are 
combined in order to derive an overall measure of dependence upon external sources of revenue, 
which  we  labeled  as  Financial  Performance  Management  Index  (FPMI),  and  calculated  by  the 
following formula: 
FPMI = (PTPI + STPI) 
                     TEPI  
(1) 
Where  PTPI  stands  for  Property  Tax  Performance  Index,  STPI  stands  for  Service  Tax 
Performance Index, and TEPI for Total Expenditure Performance Index. With this formula, we intend 
to assess each mayor’s ability to increase tax revenue in order to meet the total expenditure. Due to the 
importance of the transfers that municipalities receive from upper-level governments, which is not 
included in the formula, FPMI is a number between 0 and 1. In this vein, Brazilian municipalities are 
never able to locally raise a sufficient amount of money to cover their costs. As FPMI approaches 
zero,  the  reliance  upon  these  transfers  increases  and,  therefore,  the  financial  situation  of  the 
municipality  becomes  weaker.  When  that  happens, a  mayor  needs  to  improve  the  amount  of tax 
collected locally in order to mitigate dependence as a mean for improving administrative autonomy of 
the municipality. The interpretation of the index is that the higher the FPMI, the better the municipal 
financial performance, as the municipality becomes less dependent upon transfers. 
 
Independent variables 
 
As independent variables, we analyzed mayoral quality and population size, as discussed below. 
 
Mayor’s educational background 
 
The educational background of the mayor is measured by assessing his/her educational level. 
We coded this variable on an ordinal scale from 1 to 7. In Brazil, and following the system adopted by 
the  Superior  Electoral  Court,  there  are  seven  grades  for  assessing  educational  level.  The  seven Analyzing Local Government Financial Performance  711 
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educational categories range from 1, which stands for able to read and write, up to 7, standing for 
having completed higher education.  
 
Mayoral quality 
 
To  assess  mayoral  quality  and  following  the  extant  knowledge  (Avellaneda,  2009),  we 
developed an index combining educational background, age and previous administrative experience. 
Age  is  a  variable  that  we  collected  from  the  Superior  Electoral  Court  database.  For  previous 
administrative experience, we collected the data from the same database, employing a dummy variable 
(0 and 1): assigning 0 if the mayor were in his or her first mandate, and 1 if he or she had previous 
administrative experience in public organizations. The following formula represents the calculation of 
this variable. 
MQ = (A  EB  PAE)  (2) 
Where 
.  MQ: Mayoral Quality 
.  A: Mayor’s Age 
.  EB: Educational Background 
.  PAE: Public Administrative Experience 
 
Population size 
 
Population size was collected from the 2010 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2011). The average 
population is around 20,000 inhabitants, which indicates that the vast majority of the municipalities 
have a small population size. The median of the sample indicated a population size of 7,780, which 
corroborates the small-scale characteristics of the sample. The minimum population was 884 and the 
maximum was 570,000 inhabitants. Figure 1 illustrates the sample distribution.  
 
 
Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Population Size. 
Source:  Data  Analysis  (Instituto  Brasileiro  de  Geografia  e  Estatística.  (2011).  Sinopse  do  censo  demográfico  de  2010. 
Recuperado de http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2010). 
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Model design 
 
We structured Equation 3 as the linear model to test the hypotheses presented in section 3. 
FPMI = 0  1S  2A  3EB  4 (A  EB  PAE)  (3) 
Where 
.  FPMI: Financial Performance Management Index 
.  S: Population Size 
.  A: Mayor’s Age 
.  EB: Educational Background 
.  PAE: Mayoral Quality 
As  a  matter  of  clarification,  the  formula  (A×EB×PAE)  is  an  iteration  between  these  three 
independents  variables,  which  compose  the  term  MQ.  The  model  presented  in  Equation  3  was 
estimated  with  corrections  for  linearity,  outliers and  heteroscedasticity,  and  became  the  empirical 
model stated in Equation 4. 
ln (FPMI) = 0  1ln (S)  2ln (A)  3EB  4 [(A  EB  PAE)]  (4) 
The model in Equation 4 linearizes a data set with exponential structure in addition to provide 
an interesting interpretation for the regression parameters, as elasticity. The data also showed a high 
level of heterogeneity, mainly due to population size. We accordingly proceeded with the WLS, where 
the stipulated weight variable was the population size (S). 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
According to our findings, 38.6% of the mayors have higher education, and over 40% have 
attended  formal  higher  education  schools.  For  the  Property  Tax  Index  (M  =  33,859.92,  SD  = 
176,992.74), the city that had the lowest capacity for generating revenue from Property Tax collection 
(lowest slope for the property tax) is the city of Pocrane (-1,197 thousand Brazilian Real), and the 
highest is the city of Nova Lima (2,288 thousand Brazilian Real). For the Service Tax Index (M = 
144,264.28, SD = 591,721.73), the city that had the lowest capacity for generating revenue from 
Service Tax collection is also the city of Pocrane (-1,094 thousand Brazilian Real), and the highest is 
the city of Uberlandia (8,369 thousand Brazilian Real). According to the Total Expenditure Index (M 
= -548,231.33, SD = 2,435,097.73), the city that had the lowest capacity for reducing expenditure is 
the city of Juatuba (-23,136 thousand Brazilian Real), and the highest is again the city of Uberlandia 
(53,477 thousand Brazilian Real).  
For the Financial Performance Management Index (FPMI), (M = 0.033 and SD = 0.009), the 
city  that  had  the  best  financial  performance  management  capacity  (increasing  revenue  to  meet 
expenditure) is the city of Uberaba (FPMI = 0.199) and the worst is the city of Pocrane (FPMI = 
0.018). 
Another  issue  that  we  addressed  in  this  investigation  is  whether  the  mayor  has  previous 
administrative experience, as indicated by whether this is his/her second political mandate. According 
to the findings, over 80% of the elected mayors were in  their first mandate,  therefore having no 
previous administrative experience in government. Analyzing Local Government Financial Performance  713 
RAC, Rio de Janeiro, v. 17, n. 6, art. 4, pp. 704-719, Nov./Dez. 2013                 www.anpad.org.br/rac   
To  test  the  empirical  model  presented  in  Equation  4,  the  regression  assumptions  were 
considered  and  verified.  Outliers  observed  for  standardized  residuals  and  the  missing  cases  were 
removed  from  the  analysis,  resulting  in  a  valid  sample  of  776  municipalities.  Regarding 
heteroscedasticity, we performed the Breusch-Pagan test, resulting in p < 0.01, thus rejecting the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity. In order to correct the estimates’ standard errors, we applied Long 
and Ervin’s (2000) HC3 robust estimation approach, resulting in the final estimates presented in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2 
 
Linear Regression Parameters 
 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error  Z Value  P Value 
Intercept  -4.3743  0.2431  -17.9924  <0.0001 
Age  -0.0014  0.0595  -0.0229  0.98172 
Population  0.0977  0.0174  5.6220  <0.0001 
Educational Level 2  0.0234  0.0555  0.4219  0.67312 
Educational Level 3  0.0062  0.0538  0.1148  0.90858 
Educational Level 4  -0.0372  0.0746  -0.4986  0.61803 
Educational Level 5  0.0179  0.0562  0.3183  0.75025 
Educational Level 6  0.0263  0.0617  0.4266  0.66968 
Educational Level 7  -0.0098  0.0568  -0.1731  0.86254 
Age x Educational Level1 x Reelection  0.0004  0.0149  0.0296  0.97639 
Age x Educational Level2 x Reelection  0.0058  0.0063  0.9179  0.35868 
Age x Educational Level3 x Reelection  0.1128  0.0810  1.3921  0.16390 
Age x Educational Level4 x Reelection  0.0054  0.0201  0.2704  0.78683 
Age x Educational Level5 x Reelection  0.0867  0.0425  2.0373  0.04162 
Age x Educational Level6 x Reelection  -0.0083  0.0101  -0.8202  0.41208 
Age x Educational Level7 x Reelection  0.0105  0.0075  1.4035  0.16046 
Note. Source: data analysis. 
To assess the degree of multicollinearity of Equation 4, we used the adjusted GVIF (Adjusted 
Generalized variance-inflation) (Durant & Ali, 2013; Wichowsky & Moynihan, 2008). As the adjusted 
GVIF was lower than three for all variables and iterations, there was no evidence of multicollinearity 
in the data. There was no evidence of normality for the residuals according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, which gave p < 0.01. However, despite the absence of normality and due to the valid sample size 
of 776 municipalities, the Central Limit Theorem can be evoked, providing asymptotically normal 
estimates for regression model parameters (Williamson, 1963).  
The  model  presented  an  adjusted  R
2  of  0.777.  Specifically,  H4  was  confirmed  since  the 
estimated parameter for the population was significant (p < 0.01), showing that an increase of 1% in 
population size increases the FPMI value by 0.0977%. Regarding H3, MQ was significant when the 
mayor’s educational level was equal to 5 (i.e., high school), but the remaining hypotheses could not be 
confirmed since the critical levels achieved were not less than p < 0.05. 
In order to analyze the factors likely to be regarded as determinant of the financial performance, 
we  conducted  a  correlation  analysis  between  dependent  and  independent  variables.  The  evidence 
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terms of property tax (r = 0.69, p < 0.01). For example, larger cities are more likely to increase 
property tax and service tax revenue than are smaller cities. This conclusion is compatible with normal 
assumptions about economies of scale (Shapiro, 1963). The more houses a given city has, the more 
likely it is to be able to increase the amount of revenue by collecting more property taxes. This line of 
argument can also be applied to services taxes (r = 0.74, p < 0.01).  
The  correlation  between  the  total  expenditure  management  performance  index  and  the 
population is negative (r = -0.46, p < 0.01), which indicates that larger municipalities are more likely 
to reduce costs than are smaller municipalities. This conclusion is congruent with the extant theory 
(Andrews  &  Boyne,  2009).  The  high  correlations  make  it  possible  to  think  about  the  relevant 
relationship between the three financial performance management indexes and size as  indicated in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 
The Relationship between Size and Financial Performance Management Indices 
 
   Population 
Size 
Previous 
Experience 
Property tax 
Index 
Service tax 
Index 
Expenditure 
Index 
Population  
Size 
1.00  .19**  .69**  .74**  -.46** 
Previous  
Experience 
  1.00  .15**  .14**  -.09** 
Property tax  
Index Modified 
    1.00  .78**  -.33** 
Service tax  
Index Modified 
      1.00  -.40** 
Expenditure Index Modified          1.00 
Note. Source: Data Analysis.f  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
In terms of mayoral quality as an independent variable, which was measured by educational 
background, age and previous administrative experience, the evidence gathered in this investigation 
provides weak support for accepting the hypothesis, as shown in Table 1. This finding indicates that 
the extant knowledge (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has to be taken into account cautiously. The results 
are statistically significant (p < 0.01), but the Pearson’s coefficient is near to zero (p = 0.104), which 
indicates a low association between the two variables (Bryman, 2008). 
According to the findings, population size can be regarded as an important factor for explaining 
superior performance. In our research, we found that the larger the municipality, the more likely it is 
to be able to increase revenue and to reduce expenditures. This is an important finding, as it challenges 
the fragmentation process a great deal. In terms of financial performance, which was measured by 
comparing the ability an administration has to increase revenue in order to meet expenditures, larger 
municipalities  demonstrated  better  performance  when  compared  with  small  ones.  Our  findings 
indicate that there is a strong and positive causal relationship between population size and financial 
performance. This conclusion also challenges some previous studies that suggested size is not related 
to performance (Boyne, 1995, 1996b). On the other hand, it also corroborates studies suggesting that 
small  municipalities  need  to  be  amalgamated  into  larger  ones  in  order  to  improve  performance 
(Andrews & Boyne, 2009). 
Another issue to be considered is a mayor’s political ideology. This was a question regarding 
whether conservative or liberal political ideology could influence performance. In this study, we used Analyzing Local Government Financial Performance  715 
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an indication of left or right wing for several Brazilian political parties. In the comparison between left 
and  right  wing  administrations,  FPMI  averages  are  quite  similar,  and  no  statistically  significant 
differences were identified by the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test. From this, it follows that a 
mayor’s ideology does not really have an impact on financial performance management. A mayor’s 
ability to ensure municipal financial sustainability by making it less dependent upon money from other 
external sources of revenue is what is important. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This paper aimed to contribute to performance management literature by providing empirical 
evidence about the determinant factors likely to influence local government performance, as well as to 
the discussion about amalgamation versus fragmentation of municipalities. Much has been written 
about the factors that lead public organizations to high levels of performance, but there is still space 
for speculation about the impact of managerial issues, such as leadership and mayoral quality, as well 
as of contextual issues, such as municipal size and wealthy (GDP per head), on local government 
performance. We tried to shed more light on the situation in this paper by examining some of these 
issues.  
To this end, we examined data about Brazilian municipalities. Brazil is a particularly relevant 
case  due  to  the  huge  number  of  small-scale  municipalities  that  are  the  result  of  a  fragmentation 
process created by the 1988 Federal Constitution. Besides having low populations, they also have 
fragile administrative structures that rely heavily upon transfers from upper-level governments as their 
main  sources  of  revenue.  As  a  dependent  variable,  we  employed  an  index  in  which  all  locally 
collected  revenues  are  compared  with  total  expenditures  in  order  to  assess  the  local  capacity  an 
administration has to use to avoid dependence upon external sources of revenue. The independent 
variables were mayoral quality and population size. 
The theories that underpin this study were mainly related to the determinants of performance in 
public organizations, which is well established in the public management domain. According to these 
theories, resources, regulation, market structure, organization and management are the main sources of 
performance. In this paper, we focused on managerial and contextual aspects of public organizations, 
namely mayoral quality, political ideology and municipality population size as feasible explanations 
for understanding superior financial performance. We contend that municipality size and some aspects 
of mayoral quality can be used to explain this phenomenon. 
Our main findings relate to the conclusion that larger cities are more likely than smaller cities to 
manage revenue and expenditure well. In such cases, mayors have little power to improve financial 
performance due to reliance on transfers from upper-level governments, specifically the Federal and 
State  Governments  in  Brazil.  As  recent  history  has  witnessed  the  creation  of  new,  very  small 
municipalities, we can conclude that they are not sustainable in terms of finance. Instead of trying to 
become sustainable, these new local authorities are becoming a burden on both Federal and State 
Governments.  
The other conclusion of this investigation is about mayoral background. In spite of the low level 
of statistical association between financial performance and  mayoral quality (a composite of age, 
educational background and previous administrative experience), the level of statistical association is a 
little  higher  when  looking  at  the  educational  background  alone.  This  fact  indicates  that  local 
government  managers  need  to  be  better prepared in  order to  fulfill their  responsibilities  while in 
charge  of  the  municipality’s  duties.  In  terms  of  political  ideology,  the  evidence  gathered  in  this 
investigation  does  not  imply  that  this  is  likely  to  be  regarded  as  an  issue  in  terms  of  financial 
performance. R. C. Gomes, S. Alfinito, P. H. M. Albuquerque  716 
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From the evidence collected, we can conclude that size is an important and controversial issue 
in  the  local  government  domain.  We  also  concluded  that  mayoral  quality  is  likely  to  affect 
performance, and that previous administrative experience somehow affects managerial performance. 
The evidence provided here corroborates many of the theories that can be found in extant public 
management literature, as well as in financial management literature. However, it also challenges a 
great deal the idea that small municipalities are better than larger ones, at least when considering the 
ability  to  raise  money  locally  and  reduce  costs.  If  on  one  hand  we  contend  that  there  are  some 
determinant factors likely to influence local government financial performance - such as larger cities 
being more likely to increase tax collection locally and thus become less dependent on transfers from 
upper-level  government  -  on  the  other  hand  the  flypaper  effect  is  evidence  that  holding  local 
governments dependent upon federal and state transfers is a deliberate strategy. The results presented 
in this paper also challenge, to a considerable extent, the fragmentation practice being carried out in 
some countries consisting of creating new municipalities by disaggregating larger ones into smaller 
units.  
For future investigations, we suggest comparing the strong-mayor form of local government 
with others, for instance the American council-manager and the British committee-leader forms of 
local government. We assumed that mayoral quality gets dispersed within the amount of activities a 
mayor gets involved in, acting as both political leader and city manager. We also suggest having a 
deeper look at the financial performance definition itself.  In this study, we used an index comparing 
the  ability  to  create  revenues  for  meeting  expenditures.  However,  and  since  we  used  total 
expenditures, the concept of acquiring resources in order to keep the administration running may have 
been  overlooked.  Total  expenditures  could  be  split  into  administrative  expenditures,  personnel 
expenditures, investments, bureaucracy, and other types of expenditures. These concepts will help 
provide a more accurate view of the way municipalities spend money. 
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